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AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
THE 35TH ORDINARY SESSION of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights is scheduled to take place May 3-17,
2004 in Dakar, Senegal. A draft of the pro-
posed schedule has not yet been released at the
time of this writing.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
THE EUROPEAN COURT of Human Rights
(Court) was established in 1959 by the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention). Enforcing the obligations
entered into by the Council of Europe’s Con-
tracting States, the Court is composed of the
number of judges equal to that of the Con-
tracting States. Any Contracting State or indi-
vidual claiming to be a victim of a violation of
the Convention may lodge a complaint with
the Court. In its decisions, the Court takes
into account the various legal systems of the
Contracting States. 
ELÇI AND OTHERS V. TURKEY
In Elçi and Others v. Turkey, the Court held
that the arrest and detention of sixteen Turkish
lawyers violated their rights under Articles 3, 5
and 8 of the European Convention.
The sixteen applicants were arrested and
detained between mid-November and early
December 1993, after Turkish security forces
procured a confession from a former member
of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). The for-
mer PKK member alleged that the applicants
acted as messengers between members of the
PKK, including the applicants’ detained
clients. The applicants contended that they
were targeted for arrest because they represent-
ed clients before the State Security Court. The
applicants filed complaints with the Court in
1993 and 1994. The case was deemed admissi-
ble in 1996, and the complaints were joined in
September 1997. 
In their complaint, the applicants alleged
that their detention violated the European
Convention’s protection of liberty and security
under Article 5. Some of the applicants also
argued that they were tortured in violation of
the Convention’s prohibition of torture under
Article 3. It was also asserted that, while in cus-
tody, the applicants were subjected to coercive
questioning, threatened, stripped, hosed down
with cold water, humiliated and slapped in
order to coerce them to sign confessions. They
were held in cold, damp cells and corridors and
forced to sleep on the floor, sometimes blind-
folded. They were allowed access to the bath-
room only twice a day and were denied ade-
quate nourishment.
Some of the applicants further alleged that
security forces searched their homes and offices
and seized documents (including the files of
applicants to the European Commission of
Human Rights) during their arrests. Such
treatment would constitute violations of their
right to respect of privacy under Article 8. 
Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman
Treatment and Punishment 
The Court stressed that Article 3 protec-
tions against torture are fundamental to
democracy and are not subject to derogation,
even in circumstances involving threats of ter-
rorism and organized crime. Despite this strict
prohibition, the Court emphasized that ill-
treatment must attain a minimum level of
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Arti-
cle 3. The assessment of this minimum level is
based on all the circumstances of the case,
including the duration of the treatment, its
physical or mental effects and, in some cases,
the sex, age and state of health of the victim. 
In evaluating the applicants’ specific claims
under Article 3, the Court noted that the alle-
gations made by several applicants of ill-treat-
ment that occurred at one location were credi-
ble as a whole. The Court paid particular
attention to medical examinations that corrob-
orated the applicants’ claims of abuse. The
Court also noted that there were inconsisten-
cies in the evidence of the Government wit-
nesses and that the applicants’ complaints were
not taken seriously enough or adequately
investigated by the authorities. The Court held
that due to the seriousness and cruelty of the
treatment and the severity of the pain suffered
by the applicants, the actions of the security
forces constituted torture within the meaning
of Article 3. The Court also found that during
their detention, certain applicants were sub-
jected to ill-treatment that amounted to inhu-
man and degrading treatment, another viola-
tion of Article 3.
The Right to Liberty and Security
The Court emphasized that Article 5
requires any deprivation of liberty to be “law-
ful” and to comply with “a procedure pre-
scribed by law.” This language should be
understood to strictly prohibit the arbitrary
detention of individuals. The Court also
recalled the “reasonable suspicion” requirement
under Article 5, which presupposes the exis-
tence of facts or information leading an objec-
tive observer to find that the person concerned
may have committed the offence in question.
“Reasonableness” is determined by the circum-
stances of a given case. Using this standard, the
Court held that Turkey violated the applicants’
Article 5 protections.
The Right to Privacy
With regard to Article 8, the Court high-
lighted that a lawyer’s freedom to carry out
his/her work without interference is both an
essential characteristic of a democratic society
and a necessary prerequisite for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the Conven-
tion. In this case, the persecution and harass-
ment of members of the legal profession violat-
ed the terms of the European Convention. The
Court found that the searches of five of the
applicants’ houses and, in certain cases, the
seizure of personal documents and other items
constituted an interference with the applicants'
right to respect for their homes and correspon-
dence. The Court determined that the search of
the professional offices of two of the applicants,
and the seizure of their files, also amounted to
an interference with their right to respect for
their homes and correspondence. Because the
search and seizure measures were implemented
without proper authorization or safeguards,
they constituted a breach of Article 8.
Under Article 41, the Convention’s provi-
sion on just satisfaction, the Court awarded the
applicants sums ranging from 1,210 to 1,750€
for pecuniary damages and 2,100 to 36,000€
for non-pecuniary damages. 
INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEM
THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS sys-
tem was created with the adoption of the Amer-
ican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man (Declaration) in 1948. In 1959, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights
(Commission) was established as an independ-
ent organ of the Organization of the American
States (OAS) and it held its first session one
year later. In 1969, the American Convention
on Human Rights (Convention) was adopted.
The Convention further defined the role of the
Commission and created the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Court). According to
the Convention, once the Commission deter-
mines the case is admissible and meritorious, it
will make recommendations and, in some
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cases, present the case to the Court for adjudi-
cation. The Court hears these cases, determines
responsibility under relevant regional treaties
and agreements, and assesses and awards dam-
ages and other forms of reparation to victims of
human rights violations.
STATEHOOD SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE V.
UNITED STATES, REPORT NO. 98/03
On December 29, 2003, the Commission
issued Report No. 98/03, finding the lack of
federal representation and participation for cit-
izens of the District of Columbia (D.C.) in the
United States to be a violation of the Declara-
tion. This decision came more than ten years
after the Statehood Solidarity Committee
(petitioners), entered a petition against the
United States Government, in April 1993, on
behalf of all D.C. citizens.
Petitioners’ Claim
Since the inception of the District of
Columbia in 1801, D.C. citizens have been
denied representation in the U.S. Senate and
allowed only one non-voting Member in the
U.S. House of Representatives. The petitioners
claimed that by denying D.C. citizens repre-
sentation in the U.S. federal legislature, the
United States is in violation of Article II (right
to equality under the law) and Article XX
(right to vote and participate in government)
of the Declaration. 
The petitioners claimed that the United
States fails to afford them equality under the
law, protected by Article II of the Declaration,
because unlike citizens of U.S. states, D.C. cit-
izens are denied the right to legislative, budget-
ary, and full judicial autonomy. Article II
allows for differential treatment only when
there is a legitimate aim and an objective justi-
fication for such differential treatment, and a
proportional relationship between the means
employed and the aim sought. 
In creating the District of Columbia and
denying it federal representation over 200
years ago, the U.S. government sought to pro-
tect the safety and integrity of the federal seat
of government. The government was con-
cerned that D.C. citizens could potentially rise
up against the government and cause political
instability. It also feared that due to their close
proximity to the federal government, D.C. cit-
izens would have disproportionate influence
over policymakers.
The petitioners argued that these historical
reasons for denying D.C. citizens federal repre-
sentation are outdated and can no longer justify
continued differential treatment today. The
petitioners speculated that D.C.’s continued
lack of representation may stem from bias
against African-Americans, who make up the
majority of the D.C. population. They conclud-
ed that such differential treatment, whether
racially motivated or otherwise, is detrimental to
the citizens of the District of Columbia and can-
not be justified in light of the antiquated ration-
ale formulated over 200 years ago.
In addition, the petitioners claimed that by
denying D.C. citizens full congressional repre-
sentation, the United States denies them
meaningful participation in the national gov-
ernment, in contravention to Article XX of the
Declaration. The petitioners contended that
the alternative methods of political participa-
tion offered by the State (described below),
were not sufficient to guarantee the rights pro-
vided by Article XX. Finally, the petitioners
argued that no other federal district in the
Americas denies its citizens the right to federal
representation, citing examples such as Buenos
Aires, Argentina; Brasilia, Brazil; Mexico City,
Mexico; and Caracas, Venezuela.
State Response
The United States responded to the peti-
tioners’ Article II claim by arguing that the
differential treatment of D.C. citizens was not
based on racial discrimination nor was it an
attempt to disenfranchise its citizens. Instead,
it claimed that such differential treatment was
based on the State’s interest in protecting the
security and integrity of the federal seat of
government. 
In response to the petitioners’ Article XX
claim, the United States contended that the
Declaration was not explicit as to the frame-
work and methods of political participation
and therefore it was within the discretion of
the states to determine the structure of their
government. The United States further argued
that D.C. citizens did in fact have the oppor-
tunity to participate in political processes
through quasi-representation in Congress and
through presidential and local elections. Ulti-
mately, the United States argued that the issue
of D.C. voting rights should be left to the
American people to debate and decide on, and
not to the international community. 
Commission’s Findings
The Commission found that the United
States had violated Articles II and XX of the
Declaration by denying D.C. citizens the right
to equal and effective participation in govern-
ment. The Commission found that the denial of
D.C. citizens’ right to meaningful representa-
tion, while the citizens of U.S. states were grant-
ed that same right, violated the petitioners’ right
to equality under the law as guaranteed by Arti-
cle II of the Declaration. It found that such lim-
itations on D.C. citizens’ political participation
were arbitrary and without justification. 
In addition, the Commission found that
the United States was violating Article XX of
the Declaration by denying D.C. citizens effec-
tive participation in the national legislature.
While the Commission recognized the auton-
omy of states to structure their governments as
they saw fit, it underscored the need for mem-
ber states to meet the minimum standards
required to give effect to internationally recog-
nized human rights, such as the right to partic-
ipate in government.
The Commission found that the alterna-
tive political activities mentioned by the Unit-
ed States were insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Article XX. Specifically, the
Commission found that the existence of a non-
voting Member of the House of Representa-
tives was essentially meaningless and rendered
D.C.’s participation in the federal legislature
ineffective. Ultimately, the Commission found
that the restrictions imposed by the United
States curtailed the right of D.C. citizens to
participate in their national government with-
out adequate justification. 
Regarding the petitioners’ contention that
D.C.’s lack of federal representation stemmed
from a bias against African-Americans, the
Commission found that a racial discrimination
component of the Article II and XX violations
was not adequately briefed so as to make a spe-
cific determination. The Commission found
that though this lack of representation had a
prejudicial impact on the African-American
community, there was insufficient evidence to
prove discriminatory intent on the part of the
United States.
It is unlikely the United States will decide
to grant D.C. residents representation in the
national legislature based on this decision
alone. However, this decision is important in
that it conveys regional condemnation of an
undemocratic structure and raises this impor-
tant issue before the international community.
While the United States is generally unrespon-
sive to international pressure, especially in rela-
tion to its domestic affairs, this decision will
surely energize the movement for D.C. voting
rights at the national level.   HRB
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